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Abstract
This study develops and uses a successive oligopoly model, with
an unobservable non-linear tariff between upstream and downstream
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prices paid by downstream firms, but that there is no change in the
prices paid by consumers. The model is tested empirically on data
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1 Introduction
Merger control has been especially concerned about horizontal mergers. The
reason is obvious. Such mergers may lead to less intense rivalry between
firms and, in turn, higher consumer prices. It is argued that the closer are
the substitutes the firms produce, the larger is the potential anti-competitive
effect.1 However, an upstream merger in a successive oligopoly may not fit
easily into such an intuitive and simple reasoning. The existence of a non-
linear wholesale price contract between upstream and downstream firms, such
as a two-part tariff consisting of a marginal wholesale price and a fixed whole-
sale price (or some rebate scheme), may affect the price for final consumers
following an upstream merger. The purpose of this study is to investigate
the price effects of an upstream merger. We show theoretically that an up-
stream merger that leads to more market power may have no effect on the
downstream firms’ consumer prices (prices to the final consumers). Such an
upstream merger is expected only to lead to a profit shift between upstream
and downstream firms. The theoretical predictions are tested on data from
an upstream merger in the Norwegian food sector, and more particularly
in the egg market. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that this
1One clear statement of this principle appears in the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines
from August 2010, where they focus on diversion ratios: ’Diversion ratios between products
sold by one merging firm and products sold by the other merging firm can be very informa-
tive for assessing unilateral price effects, with higher diversion ratios indicating a greater
likelihood of such effects.’ (page 21). This principle was first explained in Werden (1996).
It was further elaborated in Farrell and Shapiro (2010), who introduced the concept of
Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP).
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particular upstream merger led to higher average wholesale prices, but led
to no change in consumer prices. The downstream firms, and not the final
consumers, pay the price for the upstream merger.
Most models of horizontal mergers neglect the role of vertical structure
in an industry.2 This can be an innocuous assumption, if any price increase
from an upstream to a downstream firm due to an upstream merger is passed
on to consumers. However, even with a simple linear wholesale price between
upstream and downstream firms, the pass-through rate can vary a lot depend-
ing on - among other things - the demand function.3 If non-linear pricing
between upstream and downstream firms were introduced, there might be an
even less clear relationship between the prices offered by upstream to down-
stream firms and the downstream firms’ prices to its final consumers. The
reason is that changes in the bargaining power due to an upstream merger
may lead to changes in the fixed transfer between the upstream and the
downstream firms rather than in the marginal wholesale price, and thereby
would provide less incentive for the downstream firm to change the prices
offered to the final consumers.
In this paper, we develop a model with a successive oligopoly. The down-
stream firms set linear prices to the end-users, while the upstream and down-
2Two seminal articles are Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Werden (1996). The first
analyzed horizontal mergers with Cournot competition and identical products, while the
second analyzed horizontal mergers in a setting with Bertrand competition and differen-
tiated products.
3See, for example, Crooke et al. (1999), who demonstrate the very diverse predictions
for post-merger price increases following on from the choice of a linear, logit, almost-ideal
demand system (AIDS), or isoelastic demand function.
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stream firms bargain over a non-linear contract. Contracts between upstream
and downstream firms are unobservable. The non-linear contract could take
many forms, such as a rebate scheme. To simplify, without loss of generality,
this is modeled as if the upstream firms set a two-part tariff consisting of a
price per unit and a fixed fee. In this setting, we show theoretically that an
upstream merger will not have any effect on the prices per unit paid by down-
stream firms (i.e. the marginal wholesale price), but only on the fixed fees
for the merging parties. The intuition is that unobservable contracts make it
impossible to deviate from a marginal wholesale price equal to marginal cost,
and therefore that all bargaining power stemming from the upstream merger
will be transmitted into changes in the merging parties’ fixed wholesale fees.
When the downstream firms’ input price on the last unit is not changed
following an upstream merger, the downstream firms have no incentive to
change the prices they offer to consumers.
The theoretical model is simple, but captures the idea that an upstream
merger may mainly lead to changes in non-marginal wholesale fees. The
empirical prediction would then be that an upstream merger leads to higher
average prices paid by downstream to upstream firms (due to higher non-
marginal wholesale fees), while there are no changes in the prices charged to
the downstream firms’ consumers. We test these predictions on the data for
an upstream merger in the egg industry in Norway in 2005. The egg producer
Prior acquired Norg˚arden, and the merged entity increased its market share
for eggs in Norway from 61% to 74% for deliveries to the four grocery chains
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selling eggs to final consumers.4 Norway imposes heavy constraints on egg
imports, so according to the traditional approach to horizontal mergers, such
a merger would have anti-competitive effects. The Norwegian Competition
Authority disapproved the merger, arguing among other things that it would
lead to higher prices to consumers. This decision was overturned after an
appeal to the Ministry of Government Administration and Reform. The
Ministry accepted that it was an anti-competitive merger, but allowed it
in order to increase the upstream firms’ and, in turn, farmers’ revenues.
This therefore presents a unique chance to investigate an upstream merger
that both competition authorities and other parties claimed had an anti-
competitive effect.
Monthly prices (price indices) for eggs at the wholesale and consumer
level are available for the period 2000-2009, which is several years before and
after the merger in 2005. First, we find no effect of the upstream merger on
consumer prices. This is consistent with our prediction, but might be ex-
plained by no additional exploitation of market power by the upstream firms
after the merger. Second, we find a structural break in the average prices
paid by the downstream firms to the merging parties. This is not consistent
with what we would expect if there were no increases in upstream market
power. The results are consistent with the prediction that the upstream
merger lead to changes in the fixed transfers to the merged firm, and thus
that the upstream firms do have market power. The results are also in line
4In this paper, the terms ‘acquisition’ and ‘merger’ will be used interchangeably
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with anecdotal evidence indicating that fixed fees and rebates are used in
the secret vertical contracts in this particular market. We investigate other
possible explanations – such as changes in upstream firms’ costs or changes
in retail concentration – but these other factors cannot explain the observed
price patterns.
Although upstream mergers are common, the theoretical literature on
them is sparse. Some early contributions focused on linear contracts be-
tween upstream and downstream firms, and therefore do not capture the
main mechanism focused on in this paper.5 Inderst and Wey (2003) model
non-linear contracts, but they assume that downstream firms are indepen-
dent and therefore do not capture any possible anti-competitive effects in the
downstream market. Milliou and Petrakis (2007) apply a successive duopoly
model to study upstream mergers, but they focus on how upstream mergers
may influence the choice between two-part tariffs and a linear wholesale price.
They assume Cournot competition downstream and observability. This leads
to marginal wholesale prices below marginal costs, and even more so after
an upstream merger. In their main model, unlike in our study, they there-
fore find that an upstream merger leads to lower consumer prices. Finally,
O’Brien and Shaffer (2005) apply a model similar to ours, except for assuming
monopoly in the downstream market and observable contracts. The theoret-
ical model presented here is an extension of their model, and it is found that
5See Horn and Wolinsky (1988), von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) and Dobson and Water-
son (1997).
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their main results extend to a more general setting with several downstream
firms and unobservable contracts.6 We also claim generalizability beyond the
finding for our specific theoretical model tailor-made to the Norwegian egg
market. We argue that this might happen with several models that include
non-linear contracts between upstream and downstream firms.
The empirical literature on the price effects of upstream mergers is even
more sparse. To our knowledge, Villas-Boas (2007a) and Manuszak (2010)
are the only empirical investigations that explicitly analyze the price effects
in the consumer market from an upstream merger.7 They do not have ac-
cess to wholesale prices. They estimate consumer demand, make assump-
tions concerning the price tariff between the upstream and the downstream
firms, and then use their demand estimates to simulate the effects of an up-
stream merger on consumer prices.8 In contrast to their study, we have data
for wholesale prices and can test how the upstream merger affected average
wholesale prices.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
6O’Brien and Shaffer (2005) indicate that their results extend to an oligopoly setting
downstream, but they do not explicitly model downstream competition.
7There are other empirical studies of mergers that do not discuss vertical structure,
but which nevertheless can shed light on whether there is any price effect of an upstream
merger that is passed on to final consumers. See, for example, Ashenfelter and Hosken
(2010). They analyze five upstream mergers in the US. They find that four of the five
resulted in higher prices to final consumers.
8They focus mainly on situations with a linear contract between upstream and down-
stream firms. There are studies that use estimated consumer demand to test for the
contract between upstream and downstream firms, for example whether it is non-linear
(see, for example, Villas-Boas (2007b) and Bonnet and Dubois (2010)). However, these
papers do not analyze the effects of upstream mergers.
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derives testable predictions. Section 3 illustrates the results by reporting the
observed price effects of an upstream merger in a the Norwegian egg industry,
and Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
O’Brien and Shaffer (2005) analyze a setting with oligopoly upstream and
monopoly downstream, with two-part tariffs between upstream and down-
stream firms. In the particular successive oligopoly we investigate, there are
unobservable non-linear contracts between upstream and downstream firms.
These features are identical with the assumptions made in O’Brien and Shaf-
fer, except for their assumption of a downstream monopoly with observable
contracts. It is therefore natural to extend the model in O’Brien and Shaffer
(2005) to a successive oligopoly with unobservable contracts, and apply this
model to predict the price effects of an upstream merger in this particular
market.9
2.1 The model and pre-merger equilibria
Let N ≥ 2 single-product producers each supply a differentiated product to
a set of M ≥ 1 differentiated retailers. If every retailer carries every prod-
uct, the consumers must choose how much to buy of product i (i = 1, ...N)
at retailer r (r = 1, ...M), meaning that they choose between N ·M prod-
9The model and results presented are borrowed from Ulsaker (2012).
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uct/retailer combinations. The demand for product i at retailer r is given
by
qir = Qir(p), (1)
where p is a vector of all retail prices. Let the demand functions be sym-
metric, and assume that demand for product i at retailer r is a negative
function of the price of i at r, and a positive function of all other consumer
prices.10 Own-price effects dominate cross-price effects, that is, −∂Qir
∂pir
>
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
∂Qjr
∂pjr
+
M∑
s=1,s6=r
N∑
k=1
∂Qks
∂pks
.
The structure of the game is as follows: In the first stage, each producer
negotiates with each retailer over a supply contract. The contract between
producer i and retailer r takes the following form: Tir (qir) = wirqir + fir. All
N ·M negotiations are assumed to take place simultaneously and indepen-
dently, and each party in a given negotiation takes the outcome of the other
N ∗M − 1 negotiations as given.11 In the second stage, the multi-product
retailers compete in prices, demands are satisfied and payments are made in
accordance with contracts. Assume that for every vector of wholesale prices
w, there exists a unique equilibrium of retail prices, p = P(w). This makes
10Symmetry is assumed for expositional convenience. The main results would hold also
with asymmetric demand.
11The assumption of simultaneous and independent negotiations is also made in Inderst
and Wey (2003) and in Milliou and Petrakis (2007). One interpretation is that each firm
sends one representative to each of the negotiations the firm participates in, and that
representatives are not able to coordinate their actions.
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it possible to write the demand at retail level as qir = Qir(w) As on con-
sumer level, let wholesale own-price effects dominate cross-price effects. Let
the contracts of rival retailers be unobserved throughout the game. This
means that the price of the products set by retailer r is independent of the
outcome of the negotiations between the producers and the rival retailers.
On the other hand, the quantity qir actually sold depends on all wholesale
prices.
The outcome of the negotiations between producer i and retailer r is
assumed to be the solution to the following problem:
max
wir,fir
Nir = γ
ir ln (pii − νri ) +
(
1− γir) ln (pir − νir) , (2)
where γir ∈ (0, 1) represents the bargaining power of the producer in this
particular negotiation. pii and pir are the profits of the producer and retailer,
respectively, and νri and ν
i
r their disagreement payoffs. In this negotiation, it
is not the profit that stems from the sale of product i at retailer r that a firm
seeks to maximize, but the firm’s total profit. The profits in the objective
function are therefore:
pii = Qir(w) (wir − c) + fir +
M∑
s=1,s6=r
(Qis(w) (wis − c) + fis) (3)
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and
pir = Qir(w) (Pir(w)− wir)−fir+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(Qjr(w) (Pjr(w)− wjr)− fjr) . (4)
The ‘disagreement profits’ are the profit the firms can expect to earn through
the other negotiations if the current negotiation breaks down. Assume that
if the parties fail to agree on a contract, fir is set to zero and wir to infinity,
meaning that retailer i will choose not to stock product i. The disagreement
profits can then be written as:
νri =
M∑
s=1,s6=r
Qis(wir =∞,w−ir) (wis − c) + fis (5)
and
νir =
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Qjr(wir =∞,w−ir) (Pjr(wir =∞,w−ir)− wjr)− fjr, (6)
where w−ir is shorthand for the remaining wholesale prices.
A bargaining equilibrium is a set of contracts that solves (2) for every
pair of producer and retailer, and where in each negotiation the equilibrium
outcomes of the other negotiations are treated as given. This equilibrium
concept focuses on pairwise deviations. Since the parties in a given negotia-
tion take the outcomes of the N ·M−1 other negotiations as given, they will
have a common interest in maximizing their joint profits and distributing
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them through the fixed fee. The following proposition applies:
Proposition 1 When N ≥ 2 producers and M ≥ 1 retailers negotiate si-
multaneously and pairwise over a two-part tariff, each negotiation yields an
effective solution, in the sense that the marginal wholesale prices facilitate
maximization of the joint profit of the negotiating parties, given the expected
outcome of the other negotiations. This again implies that the marginal
wholesale prices are equal to marginal cost in equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix.
Since marginal wholesale prices equal marginal cost in equilibrium, the
profit of the producers must stem only from the fixed fees. In equilibrium,
the fixed fee paid by retailer r to producer i is:
f ∗ir = γ
ir

Qir(w
∗) (P ∗ir(w
∗)− c) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Qjr(w
∗) (Pjr(w∗)− c)
−
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Qjr(wir =∞,w∗−ir)
(
Pjr(wir =∞,w∗−ir)− c
)
 (7)
As the bargaining power of the producer (γir) approaches zero, this fixed
fee approaches zero. As γir approaches one, the fixed fee approaches the
difference between retailer r’s profit (gross of fixed fees) when selling product
i and when not selling product i. This difference will be strictly positive given
that products or retailers are not perfect substitutes.
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2.2 Post-merger equilibrium
Assume now that producers 1 and 2 merge. Let the merged firm be denoted
u. The two-product merged firm negotiates with retailer r over the terms in
a contract of the form Tur(q1r, q2r) = w1rq1r +w2rq2r + fur. The non-merging
producers negotiate with the retailers as they did before the merger, and the
timing of the game is as in the previous subsection. Let the merged firm and
retailer r solve:
max
w1r,w2r,fur
Nur = γ
ur ln (piu − νru) + (1− γur) ln (pir − νur ) . (8)
The profit functions in the objective function are given by:
piu =
2∑
i=1
Qir(w) (wir − c) + fur +
M∑
s=1,s6=r
(
2∑
i=1
Qis(w) (wis − c) + fus
)
(9)
and:
pir =
2∑
i=1
Qir(w) (Pir(w)− wir)− fur +
N∑
j=3
(Qjr(w) (Pjr(w)− wjr)− fjr) .
(10)
The disagreement profits are now given by:
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νru =
M∑
s=1,s6=r
(
2∑
i=1
Qis(w1r = w2r =∞,w−1r,2r) (wis − c) + fus
)
(11)
and:
νur =
N∑
j=3
(Qjr(w1r = w2r =∞,w−1r,2r) (Pjr(w1r = w2r =∞,w−1r,2r)− wjr)− fjr) .
(12)
The maximization problems in the negotiations are analogous to the ones
analyzed in the previous section (Section 2.1). The parties of a given negoti-
ation still take the outcome of the other negotiations as given, and still have
a common interest in maximizing joint profit. The following applies:
Proposition 2 When two of the producers merge, each negotiation still yields
an effective solution. The marginal wholesale prices will not be affected.
Proof. See appendix.
The equilibrium fixed fee paid by retailer r to the merged firm is given
by:
f ∗ur = γ
ur

2∑
i=1
Qir(w
∗) (Pir(w∗)− c) +
N∑
j=3
qjr(w
∗) (Pjr(w∗)− c)
−
N∑
j=3
Qjr(w1r = w2r =∞,w∗−1r,2r)
(
Pjr(w1r = w2r =∞,w∗−1r,2r)− c
)
 .
(13)
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The expression in the parentheses on the right-hand side of (13) is the
incremental revenue (gross of fixed fee) that the retailer r earns by selling
product 1 and 2, compared to not selling any of them, or equivalently, the
loss of gross profit that retailer r would suffer if product 1 and 2 were simul-
taneously made unavailable. Prior to the merger, the merged firms earned
f ∗1r +f
∗
2r through sales at retailer r. f
∗
1r corresponds to the fraction γ
1r of the
loss in gross profit incurred by retailer r in the case that product 1 became
unavailable at the retailer, given that product 2 is still available at retailer
r.
The merger is profitable for the merging firms if f ∗ur > f
∗
1r+f
∗
2r. Assuming
that γ1r = γ2r = γur, this would be the case if the loss (in terms of gross
profit) for the retailer is greater when products 1 and 2 are simultaneously
made unavailable than the sum of the losses of not being able to stock product
1 (when product 2 is available) and of not being able to stock product 2 (when
product 1 is available). Since the products are substitutes, this condition will
be met.
In this model, an upstream merger leads to no changes in the marginal
wholesale price, but only in a change in the fixed wholesale fee for the merging
parties. It implies that the average wholesale price will increase for the
merging parties. Since there are no changes in the marginal wholesale prices,
the model predicts no change in consumer prices. The prediction which can
be taken to data is, then, the following:
Proposition 3 The upstream merger is expected to lead to (i) higher average
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wholesale prices and (ii) no changes in consumer prices.
Several assumptions might be crucial for the results reported in Propo-
sition 3. First, we assume that after the merger, the merging firm bargains
with the downstream firms over both products at the same time (bundling).
If the firms instead negotiate separately over each of the merged firm’s two
products (no bundling), then it can be shown that the upstream merger could
lead to higher marginal wholesale prices.12 Second, we assume unobservabil-
ity. If contracts were observable, marginal wholesale prices could differ from
marginal costs both before and after the merger to dampen competition.
As far as we know, there are no studies analyzing an upstream merger in
such a setting with differentiated products and Bertrand competition down-
stream.13 This suggests that, though the prediction in Proposition 3 is nat-
ural given how the contract between upstream and downstream firms will
change following an upstream merger in this particular industry, we can in
other settings expect that an upstream merger might affect consumer prices.
Hence, it is an empirical question whether consumer prices increase or not
following an upstream merger.
12This is shown in O’Brien and Shaffer (2005) in a setting with monopoly downstream,
and in Ulsaker (2012) in a similar setting except for oligopoly downstream.
13Milliou and Petrakis (2007) show that with Cournot competition downstream, in their
basic model marginal wholesale prices are below marginal costs and are even more so
after an upstream merger. However, in an alternative model they find that the marginal
wholesale prices are identical to marginal costs both before and after the merger. This is
in line with our results.
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3 An illustrative example
In the previous section we showed that the presence of non-linear, unobserv-
able contracts between upstream and downstream firms may eliminate any
price effects for final consumers of an upstream merger. To illustrate that
this may happen in a particular case, we describe and test empirically the
price effects of an upstream merger in the Norwegian egg industry.
3.1 Institutional setting for the upstream merger
Eggs in Norway are produced by many farmers. Each farmer delivers eggs
to a firm that packs and processes the eggs, and that sells them to the retail
chains in Norway. These firms are denoted the ‘upstream firms,’ and the
retail chains the ‘downstream firms.’ At the retail level, four chains controlled
almost 100 % of the domestic food market in 2005. There are high duties on
imports of eggs to Norway, to protect Norwegian farmers and allow them to
receive higher revenues.14
The largest upstream firm, Prior, is a farmer-owned cooperative.15 Prior
has had a role as a non-governmental market regulator. Its role has been
to influence total supply in the industry in such a way that a target aver-
14The information in this Section builds on the public decision letter of September 29
2005 by the Norwegian Competition Authority (Konkurransetilsynet) concerning Prior’s
acquisition of Norg˚arden in the Norwegian egg market.
15In the theoretical model we did not take into account that the producer was a coop-
erative. However, it does not matter for our theoretical predictions, since a cooperative
can be regarded as a firm that is integrated upstream. Prior later merged with the meat
producer Gilde, which was also a cooperative; the merged entity was named Nortura.
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age wholesale price is reached (the ‘ma˚lprisen’). For example, Prior could
propose exports of egg products, and measures that dampened the farmers’
incentives to increase egg production. However, Prior had no direct control
over other upstream firms’ total production, nor over the prices they offered
to downstream firms.
Prior, with 61 % of the total supply in the Norwegian market, announced
on March 31 2005 that they would acquire Norg˚arden, the second largest
supplier with 14 % of total supply. In their ‘efficiency defense’ for the acqui-
sition, they claimed that the acquisition would enable them to regulate the
market more efficiently. 16:
‘The parties claim that it is crucial that Prior as a market regulator con-
trol the supply from a sufficiently large number of upstream firms to ensure
an efficient control over the total supply in Norway (our translation).’17
This indicates that a motivation for the acquisition was to strengthen
the market power in order for the upstream firm to extract a higher average
price from the downstream firms. In Figure 1 Prior’s market share before
and after the merger is shown.
[Figure 1 about here]
16Note that Norway uses a ‘total welfare’ standard in merger control, which means that
all kinds of efficiency gains should be taken into account. In addition to the argument put
forward here, they also claimed that the acquisition would lead to savings in fixed costs.
17See the Norwegian Competition Authority’s decision letter from September 29 2005
on Prior’s acquisition of Norg˚arden, page 32.
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As seen from the figure, Prior’s market share was decreasing before the
merger. After the merger the market share suddenly increased by approx-
imately 10 percentage points, but then gradually decreased again. Prior’s
market share in 2012 was above its share when the merger took place. The
fall in the market share before the merger indicates a potential competi-
tive problem, where Prior as the market regulator is not able to control the
quantity supplied by other upstream firms. In Figure 2 both ’ma˚lpris’ (target
price) and actual price are shown, as a solid and a dotted line respectively.
The first is the target for the average wholesale price, while the second is the
actual average wholesale price.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figures 1 and 2 seen in combination suggest that Prior as a market reg-
ulator did have problems before the merger problems in achieving the set
goal. In a situation with excess supply in the industry, Prior as a market
regulator had to receive deliveries from other producers of egg products. For
example, in 2004 it received deliveries from other producers that amounted
to approximately 4% of total production.18 This indicates that Prior had
problems controlling total egg supply. In 2004 and 2005 the market regu-
lator did implement measures, including exporting at a loss, that probably
18See Omsetningr˚adet (2004), page 16. They received 2,100 tonnes of egg from other
producers that year; total domestic production was slightly less than 50,000 tonnes.
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helped to reduce the divergence between the target price and the actual price
in the domestic market during that particular period. We ask whether the
acquisition made it possible to increase the target price and the actual price
in the long run.
The Norwegian Competition Authority disapproved the merger, claiming
that it would be anti-competitive:
’The Norwegian Competition Authority has found that the acquisition will
lead to a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant markets. ... We
therefore find that the acquisition will lead to higher prices, to the detriment
of consumers (Our translation).’19
However, in their decision letter there is no discussion of the vertical
structure in this market. They thereby imply that an upstream merger will
lead to higher wholesale prices that are - at least to some extent - passed on
to the final consumers.
The merging parties appealed the decision to the Ministry of Government
Administration and Reform. In their February 6 2006 decision, the Ministry
supported the analysis of the Norwegian Competition Authority, and found
that the acquisition would lead to a substantial lessening of competition.
Despite this, the Ministry overturned the decision and approved the acquisi-
tion. They took into consideration the goals of the government’s agricultural
policy:
19See the Norwegian Competition Authority’s decision letter from September 29 2005
on Prior’s acquisition of Norg˚arden, page 31.
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’The Ministry finds that the acquisition of Norg˚arden is of importance for
the goal of the agricultural policy to protect the Norwegian production of eggs
and revenues for the producers of eggs.’20
The disapproval was therefore overturned, even though the Ministry found
it likely that the merger would lead to anti-competitive effects. On the con-
trary, they allowed the acquisition because it was expected to increase pro-
ducer revenues.
A survey done by the Norwegian Competition Authority in 2005 found
that fixed fees and various kinds of rebates were quite common in contracts
between retail chains and their suppliers.21 This strongly suggests that fixed
fees are also present in this particular industry, as assumed in the theoreti-
cal model. The Competition Authority also found that both upstream and
downstream firms treat each contract as confidential information, so that
rivals cannot observe, for example, rebates and fixed fees in other firms’ con-
tracts.22 In line with this, it is no surprise that it is hard to find exact
knowledge about the specific contract between upstream and downstream
firms in this industry. In all, this suggests that in this particular the firms
20See the decision made by the Ministry February 6 2006, page 23.
21In 2005 the Norwegian Competition Authority investigated the use of slotting al-
lowances in the grocery sector in Norway, and their findings were reported in Konkur-
ransetilsynet (2005). There is no public information about specific industries, but they
state the following concerning fixed fees in general: ’Our survey shows that fixed fees are
used to a large extent in the markets we have investigated.’ (our translation) (p. 45)
22See Konkurransetilsynet (2005), p. 55. They found that in some particular industries
the rival firms have knowledge about what they call ’the main elements of the contract’.
But even in this case the contract could be regarded as unobservable, since for example
the rival firm does not exactly observe the marginal wholesale price.
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use non-linear contracts, including fixed fees, that are unobservable. This
motivates our chosen modeling approach.
3.2 Empirical specification and results
The empirical analysis is based on two sets of price indices: Consumer prices
and average wholesale prices.23 The indices are published by the Norwegian
Agricultural Economics Research Institute (NILF). The consumer price in-
dex is produced by Statistics Norway (SSB). The indices come out monthly.
Figure 3 shows both of these indices (1998 = 100).
[Figure 3 about here]
The average wholesale price index is for the acquiring firm Prior before
and after the merger; the consumer price index is for consumer prices in the
grocery stores. The basket of eggs in each of those two price indices also
differs slightly.24 These two price indices should therefore not be directly
compared. However, it is interesting to check whether there are correspond-
ing structural breaks in those two price indices.
The primary focus of this paper is the possible effects of the 2005 merger
23Again, average wholesale price is total payment divided by quantity paid by retail
chains to upstream producers.
24‘Average wholesale price’ is a weighted average of all types of eggs, except for organic
eggs, delivered from two of Prior’s plants. ‘Consumer price’ is the average price of all
eggs sold in grocery stores. For details, see https://www.slf.dep.no/no/produksjon-og-
marked/kjott-og-egg/marked-og-pris/priser/eggmarked-i-forandring.
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on average wholesale prices and consumer prices. We therefore focus on
the period between January 2003 and and December 2007.25 This makes it
possible to compare the development in the price series in the years leading
up to the merger with development after the merger, without having to take
into account changes and shifts in the price series occurring several years
before or after the merger, which are unlikely to be directly related to the
merger.
As a first empirical exercise, we examine the consumer price and fit it
using a simple regression model where an exponential time trend is included,
i.e. allowing for constant price growth from one month to the next.
lnP consumt = β
consum + γconsum · t+ uconsumt (14)
The model is estimated using OLS on data from the period January 2003
- December 2007. The reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and of possible autocorrelation of order 1 (Newey-West standard er-
rors).26,27 The results are reported in Column (1) of Table 1.
25Looking at the years from 2008-2009 on, there are significant jumps and variations.
Part of this variation is due to composition effects. New types of eggs, such as organic
eggs, enter and are given more weight in the egg price index (see Statens Landbruksfor-
valtning, 2010). We also observe a large shift in the consumer price in July 2008. This
large shift is due to a general agreement between the farmers and the authorities (see
Statens Landbruksforvaltning, 2009). In June-July 2009, we observe a shift in the average
wholesale price.
26We also tested the model for higher-order serial correlation in the error terms, with
only marginal changes in the significance of the estimated coefficients.
27Note that monthly dummies are include in all the models shown in Table 1 to capture
possible seasonal effects.
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[Table 1 about here]
The estimate of γconsum = 0.00265 means a monthly growth in prices of
0.26%, which corresponds to a yearly growth rate of 3.2%. The exercise is
then repeated for the wholesale prices by estimating the following model:
lnPwholesalet = β
wholesale + γwholesale · t+ uwholesalet (15)
This regression, with results reported in Column (2) of Table 1, yields an
estimate of the growth rate in the average wholesale prices of 0.09% per
month, that is a yearly growth of 1.1%.
Now to the main question of the empirical analysis: Are prices at the
wholesale and consumer level affected by the merger? If, for example, the
merger affected consumer prices, a structural break in the consumer price
process would be expected. Looking at Figure 3, there is no obvious break
in the consumer price series around the time of the merger, while there
definitely seems to be something happening around the time of the merger
for the wholesale price.
The standard way to test for structural breaks is to split the sample under
consideration into two subsamples, estimate the parameters of an economic
model for each subsample, and then test the equality of the parameters in the
two subsamples using a Chow-statistic (see Hansen 2001). When one cannot
tell a priori when the possible break occurred, one splits the sample at each
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possible breakdate and finds the highest Chow-statistic. This value is called
a Quandt-statistic. A high enough Quandt-statistic indicates that there is
in fact a structural break in the time series. Critical values are provided in
Andrews (1993).
Allowing for changes in the intercept and growth rate, the Quandt-statistic
is 181.26. There is, in other words, a strong indication of a break in the whole-
sale price process. The least squares estimator of the breakpoint is January
2005.28 The timing of the structural break seems consistent with it being
caused by the 2005 merger. That the merging parties were able and willing
to coordinate their behavior a few months before the announcement of the
merger seems perfectly plausible.
Given the apparent break in the wholesale prices, the following model
is estimated, allowing for one exponential trend until January 2005, then a
shift and a new exponential trend.29
28Bai (1997) describes a method for sequentially testing for multiple structural breaks.
Note however, given that the samples used for analyses include 60 observations, search or
multiple breaks would leave each subperiod with few observations, and therefore very few
degrees of freedom. Thus, the analyses of detecting structural breaks are limited to looking
for one break only in each of the two-price series. Hansen (1999) establishes a method for
obtaining confidence intervals for the breakpoint estimate. Following this method, it is
found that only January 2005 is within the 95 percent confidence interval, i.e. the location
of the breakpoint to January 2005 is very precisely estimated.
29In all the models in which a structural shift is included, we include a transformed time
trend t that is equal to zero at the actual break point and growing (reducing) with unity
for each subsequent (prior) month, instead of the initial time trend. This transformation
means that one can observe directly the vertical shift and its statistical significance in the
actual breakpoint.
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lnPwholesalet = β
wholesale
0 + β
wholesale
1 ·D (t ≥ 2005m1) (16)
+γwholesale0 · t+ γwholesale1 ·D (t ≥ 2005m1) · t+uwholesalet
The results are summarized in Column (3) of Table 1. The regression re-
sults show a negative trend before the merger (γwholesale0 = −0.00185). This
monthly growth rate of −0.19 %, corresponds to a yearly growth rate of
−2.2 %. The estimate of γwholesale1 is highly significant and positive, indi-
cating increased growth rate after the break. Looking at the general trend
post-merger, it is found that this trend is γwholesale0 +γ
wholesale
1 = 0.00316. This
corresponds to a annualized growth rate of 3.9%, which is statistically larger
than both the pre-merger growth rate of wholesale prices and the growth rate
of the consumer prices. A higher growth rate suggests that prices increased
gradually after the merger, which can be explained by contracts not all being
renegotiated at the same time.
It is of course of great interest whether a corresponding structural break
is found for consumer prices. Allowing for changes in βconsum0 and γ
consum
0
while assuming the other parameters are constant, a Quandt-statistic of 7.11
is obtained, which is below the critical values at a 5 percent significance level
(11.79). There is, in other words, no indication of a structural break in the
consumer price equation around the time of the merger. The results reported
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in Table 1, column (4) are the ones after estimating the following model.
lnP consumt = β
consum
0 + β
consum
1 ·D (t ≥ 2005m1) (17)
+γconsum0 · t+ γconsum1 ·D (t ≥ 2005m1) · t+ uconsumt
Here we observe a small but statistically insignificant change in the time
trend. Thus, the structural break found for the wholesale prices is not re-
flected in the consumer prices. This lack of significant effects on the down-
stream firms’ consumer prices is consistent with the model’s theoretical pre-
diction.
The actual and predicted consumer prices and average wholesale prices
based on the models reported in Table 1, columns (3) and (4) are given in
Figure 4.
[Figure 4 about here]
The fit of predicted to actual prices is good.
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3.3 Robustness checks and discussion
We have conducted a series of robustness checks on these results.30 In the
first robustness check, the break point is set to be May, the official point of
the merger, instead of January as found for the results reported in Table 1.
Thus, an otherwise identical model as described by equations (16) and (17)
with D (t ≥ 2005m1) replaced by D (t ≥ 2005m5) are estimated. The results
of these exercises are almost identical.
The wholesale price series, in which we found a structural break around
the time of the merger, could of course be caused by other factors than
the merger, both on the input side and the output side. To control for the
former, we include a series of controls. First, we include log-transformed price
indices for soybeans and soybean oil, together with log-transformed prices
indices for wheat and maize. All these factors are important ingredients in
the feed of egg-laying poultry. We also include an index of electricity prices,
since electricity is used to heat the farms. The results of the re-estimation
of the wholesale price model with these additional controls are reported in
column (1), Table 2. The Hansen/Bai procedure gives the same breakpoint
as before, i.e., January 2005. Holding the reported results in Table 2, column
(1), together with the corresponding ones in Table 1, there are no obvious
large differences between the two sets of results. Thus, the structural change
found for the wholesale prices does not seem to be driven by cost factor
30Not all of the robustness checks are shown. These are still available from the authors
on request.
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changes.
[Table 2 about here]
A significant effect of the merger on the consumer price could have been
offset by changes in other variables affecting consumer prices. To allow for
this, we include a consumer food price index together with the electricity price
index in a consumer price model corresponding to the model reported in Table
1, column (4). We also include the wholesale price, allowing for different
effects of these before and after the merger. The results are reported in
Table 2, column (2). Again, there is very little difference between these latter
results and the ones in Table 1.31 Most important, using the Hansen/Andrew
method to reveal potential structural breaks, no such breaks are found in the
consumer prices (the Quandt statistic is 7.06, well below the critical value of
11.79).
An additional robustness check allows for some dynamics by introducing
a lagged dependent variable, lagged one month in the two models reported
in Table 2, columns (1) and (2). The coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable in the consumer price model is 0.265. This means that there is some
inertia in the consumer prices. Most importantly, no structural break is found
in this dynamic model of consumer prices. We conducted a corresponding
31Admittedly, the coefficient of the wholesale price has a negative sign before the merger,
and a positive sign after the break. Note however that they are both statistically insignif-
icant. This should not be interpreted as a rejection of a pass-through hypothesis or as a
sign of mis-specification of the model, given that the wholesale prices are average prices
and and therefore do not reflect marginal costs.
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exercise for the average wholesale price. Here, the coefficient of the lagged
dependent variable was 0.140. But again, the model shows no other breaks
than the structural break already identified. Thus, the results reported in
Tables 1 and 2 are unlikely to be caused by some hidden price dynamics.32
We have also compared the wholesale price of eggs and the wholesale
price of chicken. Figure 5 shows that the two prices develop quite differently
over time.
[Figure 5 about here]
The similar input costs of eggs and chicken meat, and the likelihood that
these products have similar demand conditions, makes the price of chicken
meat a potential comparison group when analyzing the price effects of the
merger in a difference-in-differences estimation framework (see for instance
Ashenfelter and Hosken, 2010). Figure 5 seems to support our hypothesis
that the merger resulted in increased wholesale prices for eggs: There seems
to be a break in the wholesale price of eggs around the time of the merger, a
break that is not found in the corresponding price series for chicken. The re-
sults of a difference-in-difference analysis indicate that the merger did indeed
have a statistically significant positive effect on average wholesale prices of
eggs. Note, however, that the assumption of a common underlying trend in
32The models reported in Table 1 are also estimated with a Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1)
procedure. The results are almost identical to the reported OLS results. In addition,
the models are also tested for non-stationarity in the log-transformed consumer price and
average wholesale price, using the procedure outlined in Perron (1989, 1990). There is no
sign of non-stationarity.
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the prices of the treated group (eggs) and the control group (chicken) treat-
ment (i.e. the merger) may be violated. In our interpretation it is exactly
the negative trend in the average wholesale prices that in part motivated the
merger. Nevertheless, while certainly not bringing conclusive evidence of the
effect of the merger, the analysis is consistent with our main result. Since
both markets are part of the Norwegian agricultural sector, the results sug-
gest that there was no general change in agricultural policy that can explain
the structural break in average wholesale prices on eggs.33
It might be argued that the lack of a structural break in the consumer
prices is driven by changes in the market structure at the retail level. In
particular, a reduction in retail concentration starting in 2005 could explain
why the structural break in the wholesale prices are not passed on to the
consumer prices. Monthly data capturing such changes are hard to get.
However, Figure 6 reports annual changes in retail concentration, suggesting
that it does not seem to be an issue. On the contrary, we observe an increase
in concentration on the retail level after 2005.
[Figure 6 about here]
An alternative way to test the prediction from theory is to look at quantity
sold. Since the model predicts no changes in the marginal price on inputs for
33We also have average wholesale prices for various meat products that also came under
overall agricultural policy. Again, there is no indication of any structural break in those
prices at the time of the egg merger.
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the retailers, we expect that the retailers do not change their prices to final
consumers following the merger. One implication of this is that we should
observe no change in quantity sold at the time of the merger. Figure 7 shows
annual sales.
[Figure 7 about here]
There seem to be no changes in annual sales at the time of the merger.
If anything, sales volume increased after the merger. This is the opposite
of what would be expected if the merger had led to higher prices to final
consumers. This piece of evidence is in line with there being no structural
break in the final consumer prices, and is also consistent with a shift in the
average wholesale prices caused by a shift in non-marginal payment from
downstream to upstream firms.
The structural break in the trend in average wholesale price might also
be explained by measures implemented by the market regulator Prior. Each
year, costly efforts ensure high prices, like exporting eggs at a price that
leads to a loss for the producers. In Figure 8, we show the annual cost of
such measures.
[Figure 8 about here]
Figure 8 shows that the costs associated with market regulation increased
in 2004 and 2005, and then dropped again after that. Unfortunately, we do
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not have monthly data and cannot use this as a control variable in our re-
gressions, where we use monthly data. Note, though, that the cost of market
regulation drops after 2005. This indicates that market regulation as such
cannot explain the long run trend in prices, where there was a positive shift
in the average wholesale price trend after 2005. On the contrary, this indi-
cates that the acquisition made it possible to increase the average wholesale
price without extra efforts to regulate the market.
Annual producer prices (prices paid by the upstream firm to the farmers)
are shown in Figure 9.
[Figure 9 about here]
Since the upstream acquiring firm is a cooperative, this means that the
producer price can be seen as a payment to the farmers and therefore as
a measure of the profits generated by the upstream firm. Since upstream
firms incur costs with market regulation, the producer price would then cap-
ture the combined effect of the acquisition on average wholesale prices and
the costs associated with market regulation. We also have access to monthly
data on producer prices.34 Using monthly data, we found a structural break
in the producer price in February 2005. This indicates that the acquisition
led to a combination of higher average wholesale prices and fewer resources
34These monthly producer prices are confidential. Somewhat more details may be given
by the authors on request.
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spent on market regulation.
We have considered average wholesale prices of the acquiring firm before
and after the acquisition. Ideally, we should then compare that with the
changes in consumer prices for the acquiring firm’s products. However, the
large size of the acquiring firm implies that if there were any change in the
acquiring firm’s consumer price, it would also be expected to show up in the
general consumer price index for eggs we are using.
It would also be of interest to check the average wholesale price for the
non-merging firms. In theory, this acquisition should not affect the aver-
age prices of non-merging firms. However, there have been some acquisitions
among the remaining firms in the industry. Due to this, the prediction would
be that the average wholesale price has risen also for these firms. Unfortu-
nately, we do not have access to detailed wholesale price data for these other
firms.
The empirical models in this article are all estimated using price indices.
Some might argue that a proper analysis should be based on micro data,
such as scanner data, for the products. Note however, scanner data for
the transaction between upstream and downstream firms are hard to get, or
non-existent. With scanner data only available at the consumer level one has
to make (non-testable) assumptions concerning the price tariff between the
upstream and the downstream firms. Furthermore, scanner data are used to
estimate a system of demand equations such that one can simulate the effects
of a merger. Note however, with our data we can observer the price-effects of
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the merger directly and do not have to rely on all the necessary assumptions
being made when doing merger simulations. These arguments have therefore
convinced us not to investigate this path further.
The set of robustness checks buttress our initial findings reported in Sec-
tion 3.2; there is a structural break in the wholesale prices which is most likely
related to the 2005 merger. There are no effects of the upstream merger on
consumer prices. The structural break in the wholesale prices, with no cor-
responding structural break in the consumer prices, lends support to our
theoretical model.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model of a successive oligopoly with
a non-linear tariff between upstream and downstream firms, and use it to
analyze the possible anti-competitive effects of an upstream merger. We
apply the model to predict the price effects of an upstream merger in the
Norwegian egg market. We find that the empirical results of this particular
upstream merger are consistent with the predictions from the theoretical
model. The upstream merger led to higher average prices to upstream firms,
while the prices to final consumers did not change.
We do not claim that these results are unique to this particular model,
or to this particular case. We have reason to believe that the mechanism at
work can be quite general. The crucial element is the non-linear contract
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between the upstream and the downstream firms. With a non-linear price,
an increase in market power due to an upstream merger may affect mainly
the fixed element and have no, or only a limited, effect on the price on
the last unit. If that is the case, we can expect few if any price effects
on final consumers. Given that non-linear contracts between upstream and
downstream firms are common in many industries, we expect that upstream
mergers may often have quite limited or zero price effects on final consumers.
Ashenfelter and Hosken (2010) report the results of ex post evaluation
of five US mergers. They consider those mergers that seem most likely to
be problematic, and therefore they present their results as an upper bound
on the likely price effects on final consumers of mergers. However, all five
mergers are upstream mergers and they investigate the price effect for final
consumers. Our model and results indicates that non-linear contracts can
dampen the pass-through rate. In that respect their study is probably not
an upper bound on the price effect for final consumers following a horizontal
merger between firms that sell directly to final consumers.
In 2010 the EU Commission cleared a merger between Unilever and Sara
Lee, subject to structural remedies. Some brands owned by Sara Lee were
sold. According to the Commission, this was ‘a strong and clear-cut remedy,
.. to ensure that the transaction would not lead to higher prices for con-
sumers.’35 This was an upstream merger. Unilever and Sara Lee sold their
35See case COMP/M.5658 – Unilever/Sara Lee. The quote is from the press release
from the EU Commission IP/10/1514 from 17 November 2010.
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products to retailers which, in turn, sold to final consumers. One impor-
tant piece of evidence concerning price effects seems to be the results from a
merger simulation model.36 However, the vertical structure of the market is
not taken into account in the merger simulation. They use scanner data on
the consumer level to estimate demand, and this demand system is applied to
estimate the price increase after the merger. This is the standard approach
for merger simulations, but it nevertheless ignores the vertical dimension we
are concerned about. As far as we understand it, contracts between up-
stream and downstream firms in this particular industry are not observed by
rivals and they might include non-linear elements such as rebates and fixed
fees. Our study suggests that in an industry with such a vertical structure
there might not be any price increase for the final consumers following such
a merger as the one between Unilever and Sara Lee. If so, the price increases
estimated from the merger simulation model in this particular merger case
may have been flawed.
The results of this analysis have important implications for merger assess-
ment by competition authorities. Simply assuming that the price increase
from an upstream merger will be passed on to final consumers can be mis-
guided, as it apparently was in the upstream merger investigated in this pa-
per. The Norwegian Competition Authority’s disapproval decision claimed
- among other things - that it would lead to higher consumer prices. This
36See the Technical Annex to the decision, where the merger simulation model is de-
scribed.
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turned out to be wrong. However, an upstream merger may have other ef-
fects not investigated here. For example, it may lead to less rivalry in R&D.
This suggests that when assessing upstream mergers, competition authorities
should be less concerned about the price effect on final consumers and more
concerned about other effects, such as the effects on innovation.
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5 Appendix A
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The negotiating parties solve:
max
wir,fir
Nir = γ
ir ln (pii − νri ) +
(
1− γir) ln (pir − νir)
The first order conditions are given by:
∂Nir
∂fir
= 0⇔
γir
(
pir − νir
)
=
(
1− γir) (pii − νri )
∂Nir
∂wir
= 0⇔
γir
∂pii
∂wir
pii − νri
= − (1− γir) ∂pir∂wir
pir − νir
.
Combining the first order conditions yields:
∂pii
∂wir
+
∂pir
∂wir
= 0.
Since rivals can not respond to changes in wir, changes in wir affect the bi-
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lateral profit of producer i and retailer r only through the effects on the retail
prices at retailer r. Maximizing (pii + pir) = Qir(p) (pir − wir)+Qir(p) (wir − c)+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Qjr(p) (pjr − wjr) +
M∑
s=1,s6=r
Qis(p) (wis − c) with respect to wir gives us
a first-order condition that can be written as:
(
∂Qir
∂wir
(pir − wir) +Qir(w)∂Pir
∂wir
)
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(
∂Qjr
∂wir
(pjr − wjr) +Qjr(w) ∂pjr
∂wir
)
+
∂Qir
∂wir
(wir − c) +
M∑
s=1,s6=r
∂Qis
∂wir
(wis − c)
= 0.
The first two terms of the left hand side can be written:
∂Pir
∂wir
[
∂Qir
∂pir
(pir − wir) +Qir(p) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
∂Qjr
∂pir
(pjr − wjr)
]
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
∂Pjr
∂wir
[
∂Qjr
∂pjr
(pjr − wjr) +Qjr(p) + ∂Qir
∂pjr
(pir − wir) +
N∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
∂Qkr
∂pjr
(pkr − wkr)
]
,
and are zero by the first-order conditions of the retailer in the retail price-
setting stage. This leaves us with the following condition:
∂Qir
∂wir
(wir − c) +
M∑
s=1,s6=r
∂Qis
∂wir
(wis − c) = 0.
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In a symmetrical equilibrium with all wholesale prices equal to w∗,we must
have (w∗ − c)
(
∂Qir
∂wir
+
M∑
s=1,s 6=r
∂Qis
∂wir
)
= 0. Since own effects dominate cross
effects, this can only be the case when w∗ = c.
5.2 Derivation of Equation 7
The first-order condition for fir can be written as:
∂Nir
∂fir
= 0⇔
fir = γ
ir

Qir(w) (Pir(w)− wir) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Qjr(w) (Pjr(w)− wjr)
−
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Qjr(wir =∞,w∗−ir)
(
Pjr(wir =∞,w∗−ir)− wjr
)

− (1− γir)

Qir(w) (wir − c) +
M∑
s=1,s 6=r
Qis(w) (wis − c)
−
M∑
s=1,s6=r
Qis(wir =∞,w∗−ir) (wis − c)

In equilibrium, all marginal wholesale prices are equal to marginal cost,
and the expression above is reduced to Equation 7.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The parties of the negotiation solve:
max
w1r,w2r,fur
Nur = γ
ur ln (piu − νu) + (1− γur) ln (pir − νur ) .
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The first-order conditions (i = 1, 2) are given by:
∂Nur
∂fur
= 0⇔
γur (pir − νur ) = (1− γur) (piu − νru)
∂Nur
∂wir
= 0⇔
γur
∂piu
∂wir
(piu − νru)
= − (1− γur)
∂pir
∂wir
(pir − νur )
.
Combining the two gives us:
∂piu
∂wir
+
∂pir
∂wir
= 0.
Differentiating piu + pir with respect to w1r and eliminating terms that are
zero by the first-order condition of the retailer leaves us with:
∂Q1r
∂w1r
(w1r − c)+
M∑
s=1,s 6=r
∂Q1s
∂w1r
(w1s − c)+∂Q2r
∂w1r
(w2r − c)+
M∑
s=1,s6=r
∂Q2s
∂w1r
(w2s − c) = 0.
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In a symmetric equilibrium with w1r = w2r = w
∗
u for every r, we need
(w∗u − c)
(
∂Q1r
∂w1r
+
M∑
s=1,s6=r
∂Q1s
∂w1r
+
∂Q2r
∂w1r
+
M∑
s=1,s6=r
∂Q2s
∂w1r
)
= 0.
Since own-price effects dominate cross-price effects, this implies that w∗u = c.
The non-merging producers negotiate as before with the M retailers, taking
the outcome of the other negotiations as given. Hence in equilibrium all
marginal wholesale prices are unchanged and are equal to marginal cost.
5.4 Derivation of Equation 13
∂Nur
∂fur
= 0⇔
fur = γ
ur

2∑
i=1
Qir(w) (Pir(w)− wir) +
N∑
j=3
Qjr(w) (Pjr(w)− wjr)−
N∑
j=3
Qjr(w1r = w2r =∞,w∗−1r,2r)
(
Pjr(w1r = w2r =∞,w∗−1r,2r)− wjr
)

− (1− γur)

2∑
i=1
Qir(w) (wir − c) + +
M∑
s=1,s6=r
2∑
i=1
Qis(w) (wis − c)
−
M∑
s=1,s6=r
2∑
i=1
Qis(w1r = w2r =∞,w∗−1r,2r) (wis − c)

In equilibrium, all marginal wholesale prices are equal to marginal cost, and
the expression above is reduced to Equation 13.
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Figure 1: Prior’s market share.
Source: Statens Landbruksforvaltning.
48
12
.0
0
14
.0
0
16
.0
0
18
.0
0
20
.0
0
NO
K
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
Target price Realized price
Figure 2: Target price and realized price.
Source: Statens Landbruksforvaltning.
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Figure 3: Price indices of consumer price and average wholesale price.
1998 = 100. Vertical line indicates time of merger (May 2005). Source:
NILF.
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Figure 4: Actual and predicted values of consumer and average wholesale
prices.
Log if index values. Vertical line indicates time of merger (May 2005).
Source: NILF
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Figure 5: Wholesale prices chicken and egg.
Log of index values, 1998 = 100. Vertical line indicates time of merger (May
2005). Source: NILF
52
24
00
26
00
28
00
HH
I
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Figure 6: HHI retail sector.
Source: AC Nielsen.
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Figure 7: Yearly sales volume of eggs.
All upstream firms. Values in thousands of tonnes. Source: NILF
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Figure 8: Cost of market regulation.
Values in thousands. Source: Annual reports, Omsetningsr˚adet.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lnP(consumer) lnP(wholesale) lnP(wholesale) lnP(consumer)
t 0.00265** 0.00084** -0.00185** 0.00192**
(0.00009) (0.00028) (0.00024) (0.00025)
D(t>2005m1) -0.02018** 0.01533**
(0.00536) (0.00414)
D(t>2005m1)*t 0.00501** 0.00053
(0.00028) (0.00028)
Control variables
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 60 60 60 60
Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Note: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of order 1.
Table 1: Estimation results
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(1) (2)
VARIABLES lnP(wholesale) lnP(consum)
t -0.00215** 0.00147**
(0.00018) (0.00052)
D(t>2005m1) -0.02827** -1.00523
(0.00532) (1.42564)
D(t>2005m1)*t 0.00614** 0.00093
(0.00036) (0.00077)
lnP(wholesale) -0.21723
(0.22726)
lnP(wholesale)*D(t>2005m1) 0.22293
(0.31199)
Control variables
lnP(soybean) yes no
lnP(soybean oil) yes no
lnP(wheat) yes no
lnP(maize) yes no
lnP(electricity) yes yes
Monthly dummies yes yes
Retail food price index no yes
Observations 60 60
Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Note: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of order 1.
Table 2: Robustness checks
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